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ABSTRACT: Significant progress toward sustainability will require effective collaboration
among governments, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and citizens. But research on
multi-stakeholder collaborative efforts as tools for achieving environmental results has identified
an apparent paradox. Collaborative efforts can be extremely effective in enlisting participation
of diverse participants, heightening awareness of critical problems, and catalyzing actions in the
absence of clear public policy requirements; however, they may not be effective at achieving
specific quantitative objectives.
This paper illustrates this paradox, based on the experiences of the “Sustainable Silicon Valley”
(SSV) project in the San Francisco (California) Bay Area. SSV is a multi-stakeholder collaboration
among business, government, and environmental organizations. In 2003, SSV declared a goal
of reducing Silicon Valley’s CO2 emissions by 20 percent compared with 1990 levels. Although
Silicon Valley did achieve significant reductions in CO2 emissions compared with predicted
increases, SSV did not come close to achieving the goal of 20 percent reductions for the Silicon
Valley region as a whole. The experience of Sustainable Silicon Valley suggests that collaborative
efforts can achieve significant progress in mobilizing leadership and support for environmental
initiatives. But collaborative efforts alone may not be sufficient to achieve specific environmental
goals such as a regional CO2 emissions reduction target.
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INTRODUCTION

Significant reductions in the climate change
contributions from urban regions will require
effective cooperation among governments,
businesses, non-governmental organizations, and
citizens. This cooperation must be developed
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at a variety of scales from local communities to
international markets and institutions.
Building cooperation at the regional scale
is particularly challenging because the stakeholders
include multiple city and county governments,
firms in multiple industries, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) with diverse interests, and
citizens with conflicting perspectives. In addition,
participants must address conflicting factors from
outside the region, including state and federal
regulation, national and international market forces,
and rapidly developing influences from civil society.
This paper illustrates the challenges and
opportunities in designing and implementing a
collaborative, voluntary regional CO2 emissions
reduction initiative, based on the experiences of
the “Sustainable Silicon Valley” (SSV) project
in the San Francisco Bay Area (California, U.S.).
SSV is a multi-stakeholder collaborative group
of business, government, and environmental
organizations convened in 2000 by the California
Environmental Protection Agency, the Silicon
Valley Manufacturing Group and the Silicon Valley
Environmental Partnership. SSV subsequently
became an independent not-for-profit organization.
The first major initiative that SSV conducted
was a voluntary program to reduce CO2 emissions in
Silicon Valley by 20 percent by 2010 compared with
a 1990 baseline. This voluntary, multi-stakeholder
collaboration has achieved significant results,
despite limited funding and a regulatory climate
that placed little pressure on participants to become
involved. By the end of 2008, SSV’s partners had
voluntarily reduced their CO2 emissions by a total
of 758,000 tons. In addition, by December 2010
SSV had enlisted participation of 29 of the 56 cities
and towns in Santa Clara County and two of its
adjacent counties. SSV has enlisted 10 of the largest
employers in Silicon Valley, along with more than
60 small- and medium-sized businesses.
However, despite significant success in
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engaging Silicon Valley cities, businesses and
civic organizations, the CO2 emissions reduction
initiative did not come close to achieving its
quantitative target. The estimated 758,000 tons of
CO2 emissions reductions achieved by 2010 is a 2.4
percent reduction in Silicon Valley’s 1990 total CO2
emissions (32.2 million tons) and a 2.1 percent
reduction in the region’s 2000 total CO2 emissions
(36.4 million tons) (SVEP, 1999).
These results reflect a paradox observed in
other multistakeholder-collaboration efforts (Turcotte
and Pasquero, 2001). Collaborative efforts can be
extremely effective in enlisting diverse participants,
heightening awareness of critical problems, and
catalyzing actions in the absence of clear public policy
requirements; however, they may not be effective at
achieving specific quantitative objectives.
This paper provides insights on this paradox
based on the authors’ active participation in SSV for
more than 10 years, on the review of documents
from participating organizations, and on semistructured interviews with representatives from
cities and businesses participating in the project.
We begin this paper with an overview
of prior research on collaborative environmental
efforts. Next we identify four empirical questions
based on prior research. We then provide a brief
history of Sustainable Silicon Valley and examine
the experience of specific participants in the CO2
emissions reduction program. We conclude with
implications for policymakers and business and
environmental leaders.
II.

THE PARADOX OF
MULTI-STAKEHOLDER
COLLABORATION

For more than two decades, collaborative
approaches have played an increasingly important
role in environmental management at the societal
level. Multi-stakeholder collaborations such as
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the Multistate Working Group (2008) and the
California Green Chemistry Initiative (California
DTSC, 2008) have made significant progress
toward environmental goals where more traditional
approaches such as legislation and litigation have
failed to produce significant progress.
Collaboration is a “process through which
parties who see different aspects of the problem can
constructively explore their differences and search
for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision
of what is possible” (Gray, 1989). Collaborative
approaches permit “joint ownership of decisions and
collective responsibility for outcomes” (Hartman,
et al., 1999). Collaboration focuses on “using
information, divergent insights and spontaneity to
solve problems and develop new understandings”
(Lozano, 2007). The large number and variety of
collaborative approaches reflect the increasing
complexity of environmental problems, the
increased number of “self-perceived stakeholders”
in environmental conflicts, the interdependence
among private, public, and civil society strategies
for addressing problems, and the limits of traditional
policy instruments for dealing with complex
environmental problems (Poncelet, 2001a).
But multi-stakeholder collaborations create
an apparent paradox (Turcotte and Pasquero, 2001).
Collaborative efforts can be extremely effective in
enlisting broad participation of diverse participants
and catalyzing actions in the absence of clear public
policy requirements; however, they may not be
effective at achieving specific quantitative objectives.
Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) describe
a paradox they observed in one extended multistakeholder collaborative roundtable. While the
collaboration appeared to create consensus, agreement
“was limited mostly to general statements and weakly
defined concepts.” However, Turcotte and Pasquero
point out “consensus on ambiguous or weakly
defined concepts should not be equated with failure.”
While the collaborative effort may not achieve major

breakthroughs, the small wins generated may build
significant momentum toward further progress (2001).
In this section of the paper, we examine the many
factors that contribute to this paradox.
Poncelet (2001a) offers one explanation
for this paradox based on observations of several
efforts he studied. The desire to achieve consensus
in a collaborative effort may create social pressures
that cause participants to avoid confrontation. Some
participants may avoid confrontation out of fear of
damage to their reputations in the community, while
others may suppress confrontation in order to keep
other parties engaged.
Conflict avoidance may be a double-edged
sword. On one hand, a lack of conflict may preserve
an existing balance of power more than it promotes
successful resolution of an environmental issue. In
addition, the positive public-relations benefits of
participating in a collaborative effort may encourage
some participants to avoid conflict in order to
maintain the amity of the process. On the other hand,
conflict avoidance may lead the group to avoid critical
problems simply because they are contentious.
Advantages of collaboration. According
to Meadowcroft (1999), collaborative approaches
offer several major advantages compared with
conventional
approaches
to
environmental
management. First, they provide “a structured
framework for encouraging pluralist inputs”
(Meadowcroft). The range of inputs provides a wider
knowledge base than the knowledge base that would
be provided by a more closed process. The structure
of the process creates additional opportunities for
participants to listen to and learn from each other.
Second, collaborative approaches provide
“a mechanism for building consensus and more
especially for transforming interests” (Meadowcroft).
This provides a process for changing the ways in
which problems are defined and an opportunity for
participants to alter the conceptions of their interests
in the issues.
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Third,
cooperative
efforts
provide
considerable flexibility concerning the definition
of the problem, the scale at which the problem is
addressed, and the schedule and resources assigned
to the problem. These efforts are particularly valuable
where public policy lags behind participants’
perceptions of the problems to be addressed.
Fourth, collaborative efforts have the
potential to create “more stable and legitimate
policy outcomes” (Meadowcroft). These effects are
directly related to the credibility of the participants
in the process. An outcome endorsed by a
coalition of industry, government and civil-society
organizations, for example, is likely to be more
credible to the public and less likely to generate legal
or social challenges to the implemented solution.
Finally, collaborative processes can provide
a setting in which participants can share expert
scientific and technical knowledge, along with
other forms of relevant knowledge. For example,
understanding the scientific consequences of an
environmental problem is frequently very distinct
from understanding the social consequences of the
same issue. A collaborative process allows holders
of multiple kinds of knowledge to contribute to
a shared understanding of the issues. The results
can be a process of shared learning that produces
new understandings of the issues to be addressed
(Meadowcroft).
Other researchers including Randolph
and Bauer (1999) have argued that a collaborative
management process is more likely to create
favorable outcomes and help participants feel that
their needs and opinions have been addressed
effectively. “Collaboration reflects an attempt
to take collective responsibility for actions and
outcomes.” The collaborative process relies on
sustained dialogue between potentially conflicting
viewpoints, and promotes “a shared vision of the
future” (Randolph and Bauer).
Some forms of collaborative processes
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can be viewed as “encounters between competing
political or economic interests” (Poncelet, 2001a).
In such circumstances, the collaborative process
may produce superior outcomes because of the
learning process that occurs when participants
share information and perspectives with each other.
Achievement of these superior outcomes depends
in part on the creation of a process that controls
conflict sufficiently to allow participants to hear
each other’s perspectives and come to appreciate the
values underlying those perspectives. These efforts
create opportunities “for the production and social
organization of (new) ways of thinking, talking,
and acting with regard to environmental issues”
(Poncelet, 2001a).
Trust is both an important precondition
and a byproduct of this process. Hood, et al. (1993)
observe that trust and communication are challenging
in multi-stakeholder collaborative efforts because
of differences in organizational backgrounds of the
participants. The level of trust that does emerge
has significant effects both on group process and
the long-term viability and effectiveness of the
collaborative effort.
The perspectives of participants may vary
because of differences in “analytics” based on the
professional training, personal experiences, and
normative beliefs of participants (Weible and Moore,
2010). Overcoming differences in normative
beliefs is frequently cited as an advantage of
collaborative processes.
Collaborative efforts may produce
personal transformations of participants as a result
of participation. Actors from different sectors
may bring very different information, values, and
preconceptions. The process of participation gives
those participants opportunities to “experience change
in their subjective understandings of and relationships
to each other, themselves, and environmental action”
(Poncelet, 2001b). These opportunities may arise in
particular in situations where participants need to rely
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on each other for missing information, interpretations,
or potential solutions.
These changes in perspective may lead to
new perceptions of the tasks to be accomplished,
the participants, and the appropriate modes for
interacting across the sectors. Changes in perception
may lead to more effective working relationships
among organizations, new and innovative solutions,
and a greater willingness to address future
environmental concerns.
Limitations
of
Multi-stakeholder
Collaborations. Skeptics have raised concerns
about the effectiveness of collaborative environmental
approaches. These concerns may help explain the
paradox described above. Hartman, et al. (1999),
for example, raise the issue whether specific types
of partnerships build in preferences for incremental
change rather than more fundamental system
change. Lubell (2004) observed that, “there is
still hot debate about the ability of collaborative
institutions to actually build consensus, encourage
cooperative behavior, and improve environmental
outcomes.” He continued, “collaborative institutions
may actually do more harm than good by creating
perceptions of progress in the absence of any real
change.” He distinguished between substantive
changes, and “symbolic policies” in which programs
“fail to produce tangible changes in behavior and
resource allocations, and instead consist of symbols
connoting the suppression of some threat to the
supporters of the policy.” In addition, Lubell (2004)
pointed out that, “collaborative institutions thrive on
sustained personnel commitment because the policy
networks that form during the planning process
often fall apart when critical people are replaced.”
Meadowcroft (1999) identified four
broad concerns related to collaboration -- power,
democratic process, efficiency, and political culture
-- that may contribute to the paradox. The concern
about power recognizes that there may be significant
differences among participants in their abilities to

influence perceptions and outcomes of the process.
The concern about democratic process focuses on
the legitimacy of the participants to represent the
interests of the public. Participants may be chosen
based on existing relationships with the process
conveners, and they may not represent the full range
of interested parties. The concern about efficiency
focuses on changes in the roles of participants from
their conventional modes of operation. For example,
civil-society groups may be more experienced and
skillful at acting as watchdogs and litigants than
they are as formulators of policy. As a result, they
may be co-opted from their watchdog role but not
be fully effective in helping craft solutions. The
political culture concern addresses the differences
in political traditions across nationalities. Where
a strong tradition of cooperation and negotiation
exists, collaborative efforts may produce more
effective results than in cultures such as in the U.S.
with more adversarial traditions.
In a similar vein, Fadeeva (2004) identified
several key assumptions concerning collaborative
approaches that may not be borne out in actual
practice. First, collaborative efforts are often assumed
to create more efficient outcomes than conventional
approaches to environmental policymaking.
Collaborative efforts may be inefficient in terms
of the time and personnel required to develop and
implement solutions. They often lead to changes
in behavior that fall short of changes that would be
socially optimal.
Second, collaborative efforts have often been
praised for generating more innovative outcomes.
Fadeeva observed that while these advantages may
in fact occur, empirical evidence that they do occur
is rather limited.
A related concern focuses on the potential
for collaborative approaches to result only in “no
regret” or “low-hanging fruit” outcomes. This
concern is based on the fears that collaborative
processes may produce least common denominator
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outcomes because participants are reluctant to
address more complex issues that may cause conflict
(Fadeeva). In particular, participants may choose to
avoid addressing elements of the problem prone to
higher complexity or involving decision-makers not
represented within the group. Collaborative efforts
face a tradeoff between achieving ambitious targets
and causing participants to abandon the process if
they believe the targets are unrealistic or threatening.
Turcotte and Pasquero (2001) observe
that evidence of consensus and learning has
been somewhat limited. Similarly, evidence of
collaborative problem solving has been mixed.
Turcotte and Pasquero point out that collaborative
efforts often fall into an “in-between” category,
in which their contribution to problem solving is
“neither complete nor insignificant.”
Empirical questions. This apparent
paradox concerning collaborative processes raises
several empirical questions that are relevant for
Sustainable Silicon Valley.
First, do collaborative processes increase
social capital in ways that increase the collective
capacity to act on complex environmental problems?
Working together over a period of time can be
expected to create social capital in the form of trust
and mores of engagement (Coleman, 1988).
Second, do collaborative processes
produce demonstrably better outcomes for
complex environmental decision processes than the
alternatives? The prior research described above
provides conflicting predictions.
Third, can collaborative processes produce
outcomes that go beyond “no regret” or “low
hanging fruit” outcomes?
Finally, can multi-stakeholder efforts muster
sufficient resources and management capacity to
drive significant change?
This paper examines these aspects of the
paradox of multi-stakeholder collaboration in the
context of Sustainable Silicon Valley’s experience with

34

multi-stakeholder collaboration over the past decade.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF
SUSTAINABLE SILICON
VALLEY

Sustainable Silicon Valley began with a concept
paper entitled, Partnership for a Sustainable Silicon
Valley,1 written by a member of the Board of Directors
of the Silicon Valley Environmental Partnership
(SVEP) and adapted by two employees of Cal/EPA,
California’s environmental regulatory agency. The
SSV idea was to develop and implement a regional
environmental management system (EMS).2 An EMS
is a planned approach to managing an organization’s
resource use and the environmental consequences
of its activities (environmental aspects or pressures)
while improving environmental performance.3
Over the first two years of SSV’s EMS
effort, participants worked toward two broad
objectives.4 First, they would develop a partnership
of stakeholders representing business, environmental
groups, government, private citizens and others
in Silicon Valley to create an environmental and
resource sustainability management system for the
region. Second, these partners would collaborate
on projects to significantly reduce specific
environmental or resource pressures. The first major
project selected by the group focused on energy and
CO2 emissions reductions.
CO2 Emissions Reduction. To address
energy use, SSV created an Energy Subcommittee,
later renamed the CO2 Subcommittee. This
committee met in 2002 and 2003. By engaging
regularly and consistently, this ideologically diverse
group of individuals representing a similarly diverse
group of organizations was able to agree on a target
and timeline for addressing this first environmental
pressure. The target and timeline were publicly
announced in April 2003. The participants in SSV
adopted the ambitious goal to reduce CO2 emissions
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in Silicon Valley by 20 percent by 2010, using 1990
as a base year.
Significantly, SSV partner organizations
were permitted considerable flexibility in how to
participate. This included flexibility to:
•
•
•

•

Identify their base years of choice (1990 or
later);
Identify their own targets for CO2 emissions
reductions;
Report on stationary energy use and
associated CO2 emissions only or also
include mobile energy use and its related
CO2 emissions; and
Report for some or all of the organizations’
facilities.

SSV considered and rejected more uniform and stringent
requirements. The group chose consciously to favor
flexibility in order to encourage broader participation.
The SSV goal of reducing CO2 emissions
in Silicon Valley by 20 percent by 2010, using
1990 as a base year, was the goal for SSV, not its
individual partners. CO2 emissions were selected as
the metric to measure progress. In its 2008 report,
SSV reported that its partner organizations achieved
most of their energy and CO2 reductions through
energy conservation, energy efficiency, and onsite
use of renewable energy. Most SSV partners had
made changes in their lighting systems, and some
had begun “harvesting daylight” to reduce the need
for artificial lighting. Also, many partners made
efficiency improvements to their heating and cooling
systems through additional monitoring, controls, or
equipment changes. In addition to efficiency gains
in lighting and heating/cooling systems, some
municipal partners had installed higher efficiency
street and traffic lights to reduce energy use and CO2
emissions and had gained efficiencies in their fleets
by retiring old vehicles, and switching to hybrid
cars and biodiesel trucks. One regional government

agency had purchased a fleet of bicycles for workrelated travel.
With its initial area of emphasis established
and its metric, target and timeline for that area of
emphasis adopted, SSV publicized its plans. In March
2004, at a press conference in San Jose City Hall, SSV
announced the eleven initial pledging organizations,
representing eight businesses -- Hewlett-Packard,
Oracle, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space
Company, LifeScan, Alza Pharmaceuticals, Calpine,
Akeena Solar, and Pacific Gas and Electric Company
-- and three government agencies -- the City of San
Jose, the Santa Clara Valley Water District, and
NASA Ames Research Center.
Organizational Issues. During the
implementation of the CO2 emissions reduction
initiative, SSV underwent significant organizational
changes. From 2001 to 2004, Cal EPA provided
a full-time staff member. With a change of
administration, and a significant budget crisis,
Cal EPA chose to discontinue funding for that
position. To avoid closing down SSV, four
participants -- including one representative from
Cal EPA, one from SVLG, and two from SVEP -chose to launch SSV as an independent, nonprofit
(501[c][3]) organization in June 2004. The Cal
EPA staff member who had been serving as project
manager, took a leave of absence from the state
agency and became the Executive Director of the
newly created organization.
Throughout its life as a nonprofit
organization, SSV has been chronically underfunded.
The initial executive director served for two years at
a minimal and periodically deferred salary. SSV
has hired three executive directors since 2006
and experienced a severe mismatch between the
workload required and the resources available to
staff the program. During the fiscal year that ended
in June 2010, the annual budget for the organization
had reached approximately $250,000 and staffing
had reached two FTE (SSV, 2010b).
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This chronic underfunding limited SSV’s
ability to implement the CO2 emissions reduction
program and the EMS. However, targeted staff
efforts, significant amounts of volunteer staffing, and
in-kind contributions permitted SSV to administer
a steady stream of programs for participants. SSV
coordinated and facilitated monthly meetings
where partners gathered to share best practices
and network for the purpose of resolving energy
and CO2 emissions-related issues. These monthly
meetings were supplemented with education forums
held quarterly to share best practices, as well as with
periodic special programs, for example, a visit to a
new green building or to learn energy management
methodologies from a participating firm.
The organization continued through 2009
to track the progress of participating organizations
toward the CO2 reduction goal, but has reduced the
intensity of activities focused on energy conservation
since then. The current organization focuses on three
areas – energy, water and communities of practice.
Results of the CO2 Emissions Reduction
Program. SSV continued its efforts to recruit
additional organizations to help meet its CO2
emissions reduction target. In its Sustainable
Silicon Valley 2009 Annual Report, the fifth annual
report on its CO2 initiative, SSV reported that it
had 121 partners involved in its CO2 emissions
reduction initiative at the end of 2008. According
to the report, the 87 SSV partners that reported data
had reduced their CO2 emissions by a total of 66,000
tons in 2008 and by 758,000 tons between 1990 and
the end of 2008. According to the report, these
758,000 tons of emissions reduction is equivalent
to removing almost 126,000 automobiles from the
road or removing almost 350,000 homes from the
local electricity grid for a year.5
These data indicate that despite substantial
CO2 emissions reductions by SSV participants, the
Silicon Valley region would not achieve SSV’s target
emissions reduction of 20 percent by 2010 compared
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with a 1990 baseline. While SSV participants had
achieved reductions at a rate substantially greater
than that of the Valley as a whole, it seems clear
that progress toward an agreed-upon goal may
not have been possible entirely through voluntary
means. Legislation6 to create mandatory limits on
CO2 emissions for California was enacted in 2006
(Assembly Bill 32). The legislation required that
actions to reduce CO2 emissions begin to be phased
in starting in 2011. Testimonials from elected
officials at the state and national levels indicated that
voluntary initiatives such as SSV’s CO2 program,
helped set the stage for this legislation. In 2004, for
example, US Senator Dianne Feinstein (D, CA) in
a letter to the President and CEO of Silicon Valley
Manufacturing Group, applauded the public-private
nature of SSV and noted that its “goal of reducing
emissions 20 percent below 1990 levels by 2010
creates an ambitious marker for others to follow.”7
In 2005, California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger announced greenhouse gas
reductions goals for the state and publicly
acknowledged the leadership of SSV business
partners to address this issue “even faster than the
statewide goals.”8
Those SSV partners who, for the 2008 SSV
report, provided energy use or CO2 emissions data
for their facilities between 2000 and 2007, reported
average emissions reductions of 27 percent in that
timeframe,9 over three times the emissions reductions
the United States would have had to achieve under
the Kyoto Protocol. In the press release announcing
the availability of its 2007 report, the chair of the
board of SSV said, “Sustainable Silicon Valley
partners are outperforming the Silicon Valley by
a three to one margin … Our partners are saving
money, saving energy and helping the environment.”
In the press release announcing the availability of
its 2008 report, the chair of the board of SSV said,
“Not only does our 2008 report explain SSV’s
proven, workable model for environmental quality
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and economic vitality, but our partners’ results from
the CO2 Emission Reduction Initiative demonstrate
that the state’s AB32 goals are possible to achieve
and can deliver a significant return on investment
for businesses, local governments and organizations
of all sizes.”
These comments highlight the paradox of
multi-stakeholder collaboration. SSV participants
significantly out-performed non-participants in
achieving energy efficiency gains, and collaboration
clearly resulted in energy efficiency actions that
could not have occurred without the knowledge
sharing promoted by the program. The CO2
reductions that resulted clearly exceeded the levels
of reductions that would have occurred in the
absence of collaboration. Nonetheless, the program
fell significantly short of its goals.
III.

LEARNING FROM SSV
PARTICIPANTS

Interviews with participants from individual cities
and businesses provided insights into the causes
and consequences of these apparently paradoxical
results.
We interviewed project participants
from three of the 22 cities that were SSV partner
organizations at the time of our field research –
Palo Alto, San Jose and Sunnyvale – and two large
businesses – LifeScan, a subsidiary of Johnson and
Johnson, and Applied Materials. They provided
significant insights on both drivers of and barriers to
action on CO2 emissions.
Both the public and private sector
participants said that external and public pressure
related to climate change was a driving force for their
efforts. Public pressure was particularly relevant in
the cities,10 as citizens’ involvement was critical for
the cities to begin to take action on climate change.
City representatives attributed increased public
interest and pressure to many causes, including the
popularity of the movie, An Inconvenient Truth,

as well as the recent increase in media attention to
global climate change. Ongoing development and
redevelopment in the cities and the interest of the
public in seeing adoption of greener practices were
also perceived to be contributing factors.
The business participants reported that SSV
reporting requirements dovetailed nicely with other
data reporting efforts in which they were involved.
These participants said that they were already
developing data reports on their organizations’ basic
energy use and CO2 emissions inventory so they
did not have to do any special reporting for SSV.
Additionally, they were creating internal reports that
highlighted notable projects that reduced energy use
and/or CO2 emissions, so including these project
descriptions for SSV reporting was not a burden.
All participants said the flexibility in the
SSV reporting requirements was an important
asset of the organization. Several participants also
cited the reporting requirement itself as a benefit,
suggesting that reporting on progress forced the
organization to deal more seriously with the issue in
order to show progress.
The SSV reporting protocol provided partner
organizations with flexibility in several dimensions.
However, participants saw reporting flexibility as a
double-edged sword. By having this flexibility, there
was no firm, clear set of goals that had to be reached.
However, even with this caveat, the interviewee who
mentioned this agreed that on balance, reporting
flexibility was a significant benefit.
One participant observed that reporting
flexibility became a collective liability for SSV as
a whole. Reporting flexibility led to inconsistencies
between partners that became apparent in the
third year of reporting as the number of reporting
partners increased, and SSV staff had to deal with
organizations choosing different baselines and
measuring different things.
As participants discussed the barriers they
faced, it became clear that dealing with climate
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change was a difficult challenge for all of them.
Cities reported, for example, that getting traction
with city staff and city council was a difficult barrier;
there was also the need to get money to pursue the
activities related to climate change.
Cities also reported a lack of continuing
leadership at the highest levels (for example, the mayor
or city manager) as other priorities took precedence,
for example, public safety, infrastructure needs, etc.
As a result, in addition to a lack of funding there was
a lack of direction to city staff. City leaders did not
say to department heads, “We want this to happen”
so it did not happen. One interviewee suggested that
it is critical to have a climate change champion (not
necessarily an expert) at the top. The interviewee
went on to say that in a city that champion must be
the mayor, not a councilmember.
One participant indicated that current
city approaches were not adequate. She said that
elected officials needed to be made aware that
addressing climate change is not the job of one city
councilmember. It is the job of all of them and all of
the departments within the city. Such local lobbying
of city and business leaders by SSV is important, as
is bringing in private sector champions to meet with
city officials and business leaders. For example, at
a city-hosted meeting in San Jose, a representative
from Adobe Systems Inc. said, “We saved over $1
million by using LEED11 for existing buildings.” This
statement got the city council members wondering
if the city too might save money by following LEED
guidelines.
One business participant criticized his
colleagues in the private sector. “None of the
companies has a comprehensive program to address
energy efficiency and climate change. They are doing
individual things as they hear about new technologies,
but there is no systematic approach. This is not only
about energy; it is about water, it is about cars on the
road used by the sales force, it is about the company’s
complete environmental footprint.”
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Participants suggested that the urgency
of dealing with climate change needs to be
better communicated to other municipalities and
companies to get them more involved and get them
started on comprehensive programs to increase
energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Over time, SSV participants came to
realize that collaboration across sectoral boundaries
could be an important success factor.
One business participant reported that
his organization, along with the SSV Executive
Director, met with officials in the city in which
the participant’s business is located, to try to get
the city to develop its own comprehensive energy
efficiency program and to encourage businesses
within its jurisdiction to do likewise. Although the
city officials seemed interested during the meeting,
a significant amount of time had passed at the time
of the interview and the participant reported that he
had yet to see any action by the city.
Business participants’ criticisms were not
limited to this single city. They suggested that cities
throughout Silicon Valley needed to get involved
with SSV and they needed to encourage their
businesses to get involved as well. They suggested
that the cities should help get the message out that
there are ways of addressing climate change. “Cities
have a lot of pull with businesses and they should
use it,” said one interviewee.
As these interviews indicate, there is
strong evidence that SSV participants came to
think of climate change as an issue to be addressed
collaboratively and not just to be addressed within
their own organizations or sectors. Participants
came to realize that they shared problems such
as organizational inertia, insufficient leadership,
and inadequate resources with colleagues in other
organizations and other sectors. Sustainable Silicon
Valley appears to have contributed significantly
to raising awareness of climate change issues, to
have created significant sharing of best practices
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among participating organizations, and to have built
significant trust and cooperation among participants
who did not initially see themselves as allies.
However, the failure to achieve the CO2 emissions
reduction goal illustrates the paradox of collaborative
efforts – while collaboration can launch significant
action toward achieving environmental objectives
in ways that traditional public policies may not
be effective, they may not be sufficient to achieve
significant goals such as stopping and reversing
climate change.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

SSV is a positive example of a regional, multistakeholder collaborative initiative addressing
a problem despite the lack of state and federal
government leadership and action on the issue.
Such grassroots efforts can build significant
progress toward solving complex problems if
leaders from local government and the business
and environmental communities come together
and focus on their commonalties rather than their
differences. The results of the program and the
insights from participant interviews permit some
preliminary answers to the empirical questions
identified above concerning creation of social
capital, ability to create better outcomes relative to
alternatives, ability to create outcomes beyond “no
regrets” levels, and the ability to generate sufficient
resources and management capacity to succeed.
Social Capital. First, we asked whether
collaborative processes increase social capital in
ways that increase the collective capacity to act
on complex environmental problems? Anecdotal
evidence strongly suggests that participants learned
from each other, provided valuable tools and insights
to each other, and developed strong mutual respect
for each other.
This development of social capital
was evident in the early workings of the SSV

collaboration, as interested stakeholders came
together to address the serious issue of global climate
change. For example, the Silicon Valley Toxics
Coalition, a local environmental group that has long
been a thorn in the side of many high-tech and other
companies in Silicon Valley, was a key representative
of the environmental community in the early days of
SSV. Notwithstanding the longstanding adversarial
relationship of the Toxics Coalition with these
firms, representatives from this organization and
those from some major Silicon Valley firms were
able to put aside their longstanding differences and
work together to shape what would become SSV.
Rather than focusing on the differences between
the organizations, the representatives agreed to
focus on the common goal as defined by SSV. The
implications of this social capital go well beyond the
SSV collaboration if the parties choose to continue
to engage with one another.
SSV has been a very open process
throughout its existence. Cal EPA and the Silicon
Valley Manufacturing Group (SVMG) convened
the initial meetings and sent broad invitations to
potential participants. While there was an informal
core group that showed up for a majority of the
early meetings, that core group evolved continually
over time. Many individuals made significant
contributions over short periods and then faded into
the background. A small group, which formed the
core of the 501(C)(3) organization, stayed engaged
for most of the organization’s first decade. Other
dedicated volunteers managed the quarterly forum
events and other special events without actively
engaging in other aspects of SSV’s work.
This openness has been a mixed blessing,
but on balance it has widened community support
for addressing climate change, and it has led to a
wide range of actions not actively coordinated by
SSV. Unlike many of the collaborative processes
discussed in the literature, for example, Turcotte and
Pasquero (2001) or Poncelet (2001a), the participants
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in the selection of the CO2 emissions reduction target
did not form a close-knit community. However, this
loosely coupled community created broad support
for learning and action to address climate change in
Silicon Valley. Annual conferences created a forum
that attracted a broad cross-section of organizations
in the region and provided a platform for deeper
discussions of climate change issues and for
exploration of other environmental issues such as
water conservation.
Over time several other organizations
convened competing CO2 emission reduction
programs, as factors inside and outside of Silicon
Valley increased support for action to address
climate change. When SSV started its CO2 program
in 2004, participants reported little involvement
in other voluntary climate programs. By 2009,
many participants reported that they had to choose
among several voluntary CO2 emissions reductions
programs; these programs had varying reporting
requirements, varying participation costs, and
varying levels of public credibility.
As national and international attention on
climate change has increased, other organizations,
including Joint Venture Silicon Valley (JVSV) and
Silicon Valley Leadership Group (SVLG), have
launched voluntary CO2 emissions reduction efforts
of their own in the same or in overlapping geographic
regions. This cooperation and competition has
broadened the constituency for actions to address
climate change but has slowed SSV’s momentum in
attracting participants to its CO2 emissions reduction
program. We believe this growing competition indicates
that SSV contributed to the growth of social capital to be
used to address climate change. However, SSV was less
effective at appropriating that social capital to achieve its
own objectives.
Better outcomes. Next, we asked whether
collaborative processes produce demonstrably
better outcomes for complex environmental
decision processes than the alternatives. The
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evidence provided above indicates that SSV
participants achieved significant CO2 reductions in
the absence of any effective public policies at the
federal or state level to require or encourage such
reductions. Participants specifically identified SSV
programs that contributed substantially to those
efforts. These quantitative and qualitative results
suggest that SSV’s efforts produced demonstrably
better outcomes than would have occurred without
the multi-stakeholder collaboration.
Collaborative efforts face clear tradeoffs between providing flexibility to encourage
broad participation and stringent requirements
required to achieve ambitious goals. SSV made a
conscious choice to provide maximum flexibility
in order to encourage broader participation. That
flexibility clearly permitted participation by some
organizations, both in business and in government,
that would not have chosen to participate in a program
with more stringent requirements. This allowed SSV
to broaden the conversation within Silicon Valley
and to avoid an adversarial relationship between
these participants and environmental groups.
Flexibility in target setting and choice of
baseline enabled broader participation in SSV than
would have occurred otherwise. This flexibility
conflicted with some of the insights from the economic
literature on voluntary environmental initiatives.
Segerson (1999), for example, argues that voluntary
initiatives can be economically efficient provided
that the initiative specifies the target to be reached
but allows participants the flexibility to decide how to
reach the targets. SSV chose consciously to sacrifice
efficiency in the short run in order to encourage the
widest possible participation. The subsequent growth
of the participant list (and corresponding growth in
CO2 emissions reductions) suggests that, on balance
the potential loss in efficiency was compensated for
by the increase in participation.
However, this flexibility gave SSV little
chance to achieve its ambitious CO2 reduction goals.
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While SSV participants showed significantly greater
CO2 reductions than the Valley as a whole, little
collective attention was given to the gap between
the stated goal and the collective performance of
Silicon Valley.
Beyond no regret outcomes? Next,
we asked whether collaborative processes could
produce outcomes that go beyond “no regret” or
“low hanging fruit” outcomes? The reporting
protocol for SSV’s CO2 reduction program provided
considerable flexibility in the choice of baselines,
which facilities to include, and the targets to set. This
flexibility created sufficient ambiguity to prevent
us from concluding that participants achieved CO2
reductions beyond what would be expected in a “no
regret” scenario.
A related issue concerns the lingering
question whether collaborative efforts can produce
results that go beyond the efforts that organizations
would have taken in the absence of the program.12
Interview data and anecdotal evidence suggest
that the results reported in the SSV CO2 reduction
program include both emissions reductions that
would have occurred anyway and emissions
reductions that can be directly attributed to bestpractice sharing programs administered by SSV.
Resources and management capacity.
Finally, we asked whether multi-stakeholder
collaborations could generate sufficient resources
and management capacity to generate change, in
the absence of strong public policy mandates. The
SSV example does not permit us to give a definitive
answer. SSV was limited by lack of financial
resources and management capacity throughout
its first decade. While the organization attracted
extensive organizational participation, it did not
attract sufficient funding to provide adequate staffing.
This chronic understaffing contributed to the burnout
that led the organization to have four executive
directors in five years.
The question we cannot answer is whether

more experienced non-profit managers could have
produced a different outcome. The challenge of
producing huge results with inadequate funding is
common among non-profit organizations. But, finding
managers with sufficient environmental expertise as
well as expertise in non-profit management and fundraising is an ongoing problem.
The public good nature of the expected
benefits may lead systematically to underinvestment
by the collaborating parties. None of the parties
will be able to claim full credit for the results, or to
capture the benefits. The inability of any of the parties
to capture the full benefits from the program may
lead each participant to underinvest in the desired
outcomes. The lack of public consensus about the
issues to be addressed may decrease the willingness
of participants to invest in the collaborative effort
even further.
We do believe that this problem may
be endemic to multi-stakeholder collaborations
launched without explicit public policy mandates.
SSV addressed concerns over CO2 emissions long
before a policy consensus began to emerge in
California. This lack of consensus appeared to make
participation and financial investment in a regional
effort optional for key players. SSV would have
not been able to succeed at all without the forwardlooking contributions from leading Silicon Valley
firms and city governments.
Charitable foundations were particularly
missing from the SSV process. One leading
foundation inadvertently summarized the paradox,
when it declined to participate in what it characterized
as an admirable effort, because it did not want to
pay for programs it believed that the government
should be funding. But as we have described
above, the lack of a policy mandate to address an
important environmental problem contributed to the
initial motivation for starting this multi-stakeholder
collaborative effort.
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V.

LINGERING QUESTIONS

The experience of Sustainable Silicon Valley
illustrates the paradox of multi-sector voluntary
collaboration at the regional scale to address
environmental problems and opportunities such as
climate change. The SSV experience illustrates that,
with patience and persistence, leaders from industry,
government and non-government organizations can
help mobilize necessary change, even in the absence
of clear policy direction at the state or national level.
However, collaborative efforts alone may
not be sufficient to achieve specific environmental
goals such as a regional CO2 emissions reduction
target. Collaborative efforts may be most effective
at building broad mandates, creating social capital
and building momentum to achieve progress
in advance of public policy mandates. The
experience of Sustainable Silicon Valley suggests
that collaborative efforts can achieve significant
progress in mobilizing leadership and support for
environmental initiatives, but achieving specific
and ambitious goals may require other approaches
with greater power to compel or incent action by all
participants in a region.
The experience of Sustainable Silicon
Valley does not provide clear answers to the
question whether the paradox of multi-stakeholder
collaboration is an inherent feature of these efforts,
or merely a reflection of limited resources, and
a need for improved management effectiveness.
We believe comparative studies of other multistakeholder collaborations may provide useful
insights into this question.
The SSV experience does illustrate the
broad power of multi-stakeholder collaborations to
bridge the gaps between participants with strongly
diverging views and to generate momentum toward
solutions to complex problems. We believe that
such collaborations can become a powerful tool for
addressing emerging issues if we can more fully
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understand the paradox of collaboration and identify
management practices to help overcome the effects
of the paradox.
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2020, a roughly 25 percent reduction under
business as usual estimates. AB32 address
the same greenhouse gases as in the Kyoto
Protocol. The California Air Resources
Board is preparing plans to achieve the law’s
objectives.
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Annual Report
10. The cities of Palo Alto, San Jose and
Sunnyvale are all located in Santa Clara
County in the southern part of the San
Francisco Bay Area of California. All three
cities, like many others in the Bay Area, are
making efforts to “green” themselves and to
address global climate change. These cities
have populations of 61,200, 974,000 and
132,000 respectively.
11. LEED (Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design) is a voluntary,
consensus-based national rating system for
developing high-performance, sustainable
buildings. The system was developed by the
non-profit U.S. Green Building Council.
12. This phenomenon was explored in research
concerning the US EPA’s 33/50 program,
which asked businesses to make voluntary
reductions in their use of 17 toxic, volatile
organic chemicals. Researchers concluded
that a great deal of the reported reductions
were actions that companies would have
taken without the program. (Arora and
Casson, 1996).
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